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According to Costello and Watts (2014), probability theory can account for key findings in human
judgment research provided that random noise is embedded in the model. We concur with a number of
Costello and Watts’s remarks, but challenge the empirical adequacy of their model in one of their key
illustrations (the conjunction fallacy) on the basis of recent experimental findings. We also discuss how
our argument bears on heuristic and rational thinking.
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An assumption shared by competing approaches to the study of
cognition is that human judgment under uncertainty is governed by
so-called heuristics rather than by the principles of the probability
calculus (see Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Gigerenzer,
Hertwig, & Pachur, 2011). Costello and Watts (2014) leveled an
interesting challenge against this popular view. In their opinion, a
probabilistic model of human reasoning is able to account for
observed behavior provided that it embeds the role of random
noise in the judgment process. They illustrated their point with
analyses of some key examples, and concluded that, in none of
them, is the appeal to heuristics required to explain the findings.
According to Costello and Watts (2014), the “surprising ratio-
nality” of human judgment is primarily supported by the close
agreement between people’s probability estimates and the require-
ments of probability theory for expressions such as, P(x!y) !
P(x"y) – P(x) – P(y) " 0, for which—Costello and Watts submit-
ted—the effect of noise is cancelled out. Costello and Watts then
proceeded to argue that their model explains a number of well-
known biases in probabilistic reasoning. In what follows, we focus
on the latter claim, particularly on the cornerstone case of the
conjunction fallacy, to which a good deal of Costello and Watts’s
efforts were devoted. We start with some clarification remarks as
to how Costello and Watts’s idea of “surprising rationality” might
square with the occurrence of biases like the conjunction fallacy.
We then question directly their claim that the conjunction fallacy
can be explained by combining probability theory with noisy
reasoning processes in the way that they have proposed. This is not
a minor point in their argument, because, for Costello and Watts,
showing “that observed biases cannot be explained as the result of
random noise” would “demonstrate conclusively that people are
using heuristics” (p. 478). Accordingly, we conclude with a brief
discussion of heuristic and rational thinking.
The Conjunction Fallacy: Neither Rational, nor
Explained by Probability and Noise
Costello and Watts clearly accept that compliance of graded
subjective credences with the probability calculus is an adequate
norm of rationality. Although they do not elaborate explicitly, this
view is popular and backed by traditional strategies of justification,
such as Dutch book arguments (see Hahn, 2014; Osherson, 1995;
Vineberg, 2011) or results concerning accuracy dominance avoid-
ance (D’Agostino & Sinigaglia, 2010; Leitgeb & Pettigrew,
2010a,2010b; Pettigrew, 2013; Predd et al., 2009). Costello and
Watts also have made clear that the conjunction fallacy is real, that
is, that the phenomenon is documented by experimental investi-
gations that are methodologically compelling. Here, we will take
both of the foregoing assumptions for granted (see Tentori, Bonini,
& Osherson, 2004; Tentori & Crupi 2012a; Crupi & Girotto, 2014;
Cruz, Baratgin, Oaksford, & Over, 2015, as regard the latter, in
particular). Against this background, Costello and Watts also have
claimed that their probabilistic model accounts for major biases,
including the conjunction fallacy, while insisting that human judg-
ment is “surprisingly rational,” as the title of their article states.
This seems to call for some clarifications as to what Costello and
Watts’s idea of surprising rationality might or might not imply.
Because Costello and Watts’s indications seem rather scant, we
will briefly address this point before taking issue with whether
their model in fact explains the conjunction fallacy.
Let us grant for the moment that Costello and Watts’s model
satisfactorily explains the conjunction fallacy. If so, then although
human reasoning would not arise from heuristic rules, which depart
systematically from probabilistic principles, it would still be true that
systematically biased judgments ensue. That is, even if “conjunction
fallacy responses” are not “systematically influenced” by any factor
other than the “systematic distorting influence of noise” (Costello &
Watts, 2014, p. 477), they would be systematically biased nonethe-
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